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Socialist biography and post-socialist ethnography: on the ethical dilemmas of trust 
and intimacy during fieldwork 
It was a bright Saturday morning in spring. A fourteen-year-old girl straightened herself  as she 
stood in a row with her taller classmates, sensing the presence of  their families and teachers sitting 
behind them in the solemnly decorated community hall. Somehow her clothes felt too big, despite 
having been tailored especially for her and for this important occasion. In front of  them was a 
string quartet; on stage stood the guest speaker behind a lectern bearing the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR/East Germany) coat of  arms: a hammer, a compass, and a garland of  corn. The 
girl’s heart pounded as the speaker said the crucial words: ‘So answer: Yes, this we pledge!’ Her 
pastor’s advice rang in her head as she lip-synched the response: ‘Yes, this we pledge.’ A tremendous 
silence filled the hall, and with it came the realisation that everyone had lip-synched, rather than 
spoken, the vow. She longed to be invisible. The speaker, the headmaster, and their class teachers 
looked down from the stage at the group of  roughly forty adolescents, baffled. A slow, astonished 
murmur swelled up out of  the silence; a voice from the back shouted: ‘Answer!’ Chaos broke out. 
 
As a teenager, I had imagined this scenario in the run up to my own Jugendweihe (‘youth 
consecration’) in 1987. It was the reason that I never followed my pastor’s suggestion that I mouth 
– rather than say – the pledge to the state and our socialist future. I was far too afraid that my 
classmates might have had the same idea, plunging us into a sinister silence and triggering the 
breakdown of  the whole ceremony, which we had all been feverishly anticipating for months. 
Instead, standing in the front row as I had imagined, with the same string quartet and coat of  arms 
in front of  me, my heart pounding as I had anticipated it would – I pronounced the words loudly 
while keeping my fingers crossed, thinking: ‘It does not count, I do not mean it.’ 
 
Almost exactly two and a half  years later, on the evening of  9th November 1989, friends 
and I stood among hundreds of  demonstrators in front of  the Johannis Church in Gera, the third 
largest town in Thuringia, East Germany. A voice, desperate to attract our attention, shouted 
excitedly over the crowd telling us of  the announcement just made on TV news, that one of  the 
main demands of  the ongoing protests for more civil liberties had been granted. From now on we 
were free to travel anywhere. We looked at each other in disbelief. It was as unbelievable as the 
disappearance of  the country – the country we had grown up in and wanted to reform – would be, 
less than a year later. 
However, Jugendweihe – the secular coming-of-age ritual during which eighth-grade 
adolescents had pledged allegiance to this country’s future – did not disappear. Under the GDR, 
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adolescents aged thirteen and fourteen were educated in extra-curricular ‘youth lessons’ about their 
roles as socialist citizens in the run up to their Jugendweihe ceremony (ZAJ 1986: 46-56). Because 
of  this link to the GDR state, the Church and many western observers assumed the ritual would 
vanish like the country with which it was so closely associated (Meier 1998: 7; Saunders 2002: 50).1 
Instead, Jugendweihe continues to be celebrated each spring, predominantly in eastern Germany, 
as an alternative to ecclesiastical coming-of-age rituals. The public ceremony involves an 
approximately eighty-minute festive programme during which adolescents take the stage and are 
welcomed into the ‘circle of  adults’ (Kreis der Erwachsenen) – today without a pledge of  allegiance 
(Wesser 2016: 43-50). This event – held in either a theatre or community hall – is followed by a 
large family celebration. The Jugendweihe ritual is the focus of  my PhD project, in which I 
illuminate the connections between kinship and politics and how the socialist past shapes social life 
in contemporary eastern Germany. 
 
In November 2012 I returned to my hometown for fieldwork. It was the first time that I 
had lived there for a prolonged period of  time since I had left in 1999 to travel abroad and then to 
live in Scotland. Although the topic of  my research was in itself  uncontroversial, in the course of  
my fieldwork I experienced unexpected anxieties and doubts about whether what I was doing was 
ethical. I only began to grasp what the issue was almost a year into my fieldwork when the media 
re-engaged with the National Security Agency (NSA) scandal. It was revealed that the US American 
security agency had not only been spying on ordinary German citizens but had also tapped 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone. It was through her oft-cited response to the media, 
‘Spying out among friends – that’s a no go!’, that it dawned on me what I had increasingly felt guilty 
of  doing during fieldwork.  
 
This paper’s focus is on the intertwined issues of  intimacy and trust and the way these became 
entangled in the course of  my fieldwork. Trust is of  ethical import for the ethnographic project 
but also a crucial value in familial relations and in political relations involving the state (see 
Introduction and Goddard this volume). Trust and intimacy are widely held to be co-constituents 
in social relations as Robert Paine’s reflections on friendship remind us (Paine 1999: 43). Niklas 
Luhmann (1988) views familiarity as a precondition for trust. He defines a situation of  trust as one 
in which a person chooses one action over another despite ‘the possibility of  being disappointed 
by the action of  others’ (Luhmann 1988: 97). If  trust is disappointed, the trusting person regrets 
their own trusting choice. Trust, for Luhmann, is only possible in a situation of  risk, that is, when 
a person considers an alternative action because they perceive their decision can influence the 
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outcome of  that action. To trust then is closely associated with moral agency. Moral codes, 
however, are created within a historically specific context, and thus also in relation to – yet not 
necessarily in line with – the wider polity. In the former East Germany interpersonal trust was 
typically linked with the risk of  political criticism (Thelen 2005: 11). Trust and intimacy are thus 
particularly relevant in the research context of  eastern Germany because these values are not only 
crucial ingredients in social relations, both as part of  and outwith the ethnographic project, but are 
also especially volatile due to the historical legacy of  the State Security apparatus and its spying 
techniques. In exploring the nature of  my fieldwork difficulties I will outline the parallels between 
these issues and that of  my research project. I argue that the anthropologist and her interlocutors 
are historical subjects with a common understanding of  a shared moral practice during state 
socialism associated with a particular configuration of  the public/private dichotomy. 
 
The Haunting Past  
About a month after Chancellor Merkel’s statement, I sat with my friend Robert in his car with our 
heads bent over the photocopied version of  what had been typewritten on greyish paper decades 
earlier. It seemed to be from a different world and yet so familiar. We were looking at the response 
he had received to his request to access his Stasi file. Robert is only a few years older than me, and 
– at the time – we had been friends for almost twenty years. Although I had spent the greater part 
of  these years abroad, we kept loosely in touch. A week earlier I had agreed to join him at an event 
at the local Stasi Records Agency (BStU)2 during which he also intended to speak with a staff  
member in order to gain some clarification regarding these documents. Like him, I could not make 
much sense of  them, but I understood his concern about the date that was present on one copy. 
It appeared to be the date on which he was entered into the non-computerised database of  the 
State Security. It was also the date of  his parents’ divorce when he was still a child. Unlike his father, 
his mother had been a convinced member of  the GDR’s ruling Socialist Unity Party of  Germany 
(SED) and, though he loved her, his adolescence was marked by events for which he still could not 
quite forgive her. We did not know what the date signified but there was a silence in the car filled 
with doubt, anxiety, and disappointment. ‘Let’s just spit it out’, I said, breaking the silence brazenly. 
‘What you are actually worried about is that there is a chance that your mother might have asked 
the Stasi to observe you, isn’t it?’ He stared ahead through the windscreen onto the almost empty 
car park then turned to me, his face wearing a troublesome smile: ‘I don’t even want to think that 
far.’ 
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East Germany’s infamous Ministry for State Security, better known by its acronym MfS but 
more popularly referred to as Stasi, had in 1989 approximately 91,000 official or full-time members, 
who were mostly regular officers and soldiers of  the National People’s Army (NVA) (Gieseke 1996: 
21). Furthermore, there were an estimated total of  189,000 unofficial collaborators, who operated 
undercover – usually as civilians – in the GDR.3  The Stasi meant different things to different 
people, and the majority of  its members – including its unofficial contingency – were involved out 
of  conviction in a greater cause: future communism. It was the unofficial collaborators (in short 
IM)4 that made the Stasi appear to be omnipresent and created an environment of  profound 
mistrust. These IMs, unlike the official Stasi members, are widely held to have acted immorally due 
to their strategy of  disguise. If  East Germans encountered an official Stasi member, they could 
change the subject or not articulate what they really thought, because it was obvious whom they 
were talking to, and that what they revealed might be used against them or against others. However, 
in the case of  an IM East Germans were not aware of  their ‘part-time job’ and, as such, might tell 
him or her anything because they would presume that they were in a trustworthy relationship with 
this person as he or she might have been their neighbour, colleague, teacher, friend or even their 
family member. Although transitional justice aimed at rebuilding social trust after the end of  the 
GDR regime, mistrust seemed to intensify in the early 1990s. This mistrust was partly due to a lack 
of  familiarity with the new system caused by the rapid transformation processes that also changed 
the type of  risks (Berdahl 1999; Thelen 2005). But mistrust also increased because the extent of  
the Stasi’s activities came to light. It was the intrusiveness of  their monitoring strategies, how they 
had invaded family life and infringed citizens’ right to privacy that became prominent in cases such 
as that of  the civil rights activist Vera Lengsfeld, who learnt from reading her Stasi files in 1991 
that her own husband, and father of  their two sons, had reported on her (Lengsfeld 2011). The 
Stasi’s encroachment into what is supposed to be the private or family sphere – free of  state 
interference – became the focus of  what GDR life was like, and also became well-known outside 
Germany because of, amongst others, Anna Funder’s book Stasiland (2004) and von 
Donnersmarck’s fictional film The Lives of  Others (2006). 
With this backdrop in mind, it is perhaps more understandable why Robert and I had played 
out the worst-case-scenario in our heads, though ultimately our doubts were not confirmed by the 
staff  member of  the agency later that day. Indeed, it was exactly because of  this GDR legacy of  
suspicion and betrayal that I had anticipated that issues of  trust could be a delicate matter during 
my fieldwork. For example, I avoided using the term ‘informant’, because people would make an 
immediate link to a Stasi informant. I expected to face difficulties in regards to gaining access to, 
and rapport with, my interlocutors, especially because I was interested in family matters. But I felt 
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rather unprepared for and overwhelmed by the way it became an issue for me and for what I was 
(supposed to be) doing. I felt that Robert was more likely to understand why fieldwork had posed 
an ethical dilemma for me and I started to explain to him my anxieties and doubts that had 
increasingly emerged and that I had struggled to make sense of. When I told him that I had even 
several times caught myself  hesitating to ask certain questions, he played down my concerns and, 
to my surprise, asserted that this was an issue of  my lack of  self-confidence that he found puzzling. 
‘You just ask people’, he suggested, ‘and the worst that could happen is that they tell you: ‘No, I 
don’t want to answer that!’. But I insisted that it was more complicated, and I explained further 
what I was doing as an ethnographer: from observing people, partaking in their lives, to writing 
fieldnotes about these happenings and keeping my supervisors informed about my research. I 
elaborated that it was not so much the semi-structured interviews but the casual conversations that 
really troubled me. Those instances when people volunteered information to me because they 
momentarily forgot that I was a researcher; and that it was exactly these moments that 
anthropology thrived on because quite often it was then that you gathered the most intriguing data. 
I explained that anthropologists wrote a kind of  diary in the evening about what they had 
experienced during the day and about the people they had observed and talked to. Yet I had 
struggled to write fieldnotes because in their banality – the writing down of  people’s everyday lives 
– lie the parallels to the Stasi reports. Robert quietly listened to everything and then asked: ‘Surely 
you must not have so much of  a problem with writing about people but with sending reports about 
them to your supervisors? At least, I would have more of  a problem with that.’ 
 Robert immediately made the connection to a Stasi report and implicitly confirmed that 
my anxieties about conducting fieldwork were not simply ascribable to personal insecurities, but to 
the wider social context. At the beginning of  my research I had explained to members of  the local 
Ritual Association that I was interested in how their organisation worked but also in what happened 
within the family since the ritual was seen as a family tradition. However, it was obvious from their 
comments that the ethnographic project remained somewhat obscure to them. This puzzlement 
led me to feel that I had failed to make myself  clear and hence I questioned the extent to which 
their consent for me conducting research with them was in fact an ‘informed’ one. I decided to 
forward some links to German newspaper articles about Felix Ringel’s anthropological study in 
Hoyerswerda in which he explained participant observation and anthropology at home.5 The next 
time I was in the office, I inquired whether they had read the articles and whether what I was 
actually doing now made more sense to them. The sixty-year-old vice chairwoman dryly replied: 
‘Yeah, I think we got it: basically you are spying on us!’6  Her remark, I presume, was partly triggered 
by the article’s mention that the inhabitants of  Hoyerswerda had nicknamed the anthropologist, 
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who had filled roughly 60 notebooks about their lives, ‘IM Felix’. This comment, however, had not 
been the only such reference; the Stasi issue was palpable in everyday life. I overheard conversations 
in which people, as a point of  reference, described an absent third person as Stasimann. I grew 
accustomed to my father using the same term whenever the popular actor Andreas Schmidt-
Schaller appeared on television, after he had, in early 2013, admitted to having operated as an IM 
in the 1960s. I caught up with former classmates who, while reminiscing about our school years, 
suddenly begun to wonder out loud which of  our teachers might have been an unofficial Stasi 
informant. I read in newspapers about new Stasi revelations and I watched fictional TV serials that 
focussed on how the Stasi infiltrated family life. And in this process, it seems, I internalised this 
issue of  trust and betrayal so much that I could no longer see the difference between me and a 
Stasi informant. 
However, Robert focused on ‘the report’ as a document authored by an observer who 
wanted to elucidate what a particular person really thought through participant observation and the 
jotting down of  that person’s articulations made in moments of  trust. In the report people under 
investigation would be referred to by pseudonyms 7  rather than their real names. Indeed, 
anthropologist Katherine Verdery (2014) describes in her study of  the archives of  the Securitate, 
the Romanian equivalent to the Stasi, that it was a revelation when she read in a 1985 report in her 
files that the Securitate concluded that she undoubtedly has 
intelligence experience because in writing my fieldnotes I use a special code; I call 
the people I speak with “informers” and give them “conspiratorial names”; I always 
give the context and location of  a discussion, the informer’s attitude, and my 
questions; I keep taking fieldnotes on things well outside the limits of  my research 
proposal…(2014: 6) 
However, unlike Robert and me, Verdery seems surprised about these parallels.8 She admits that it 
led her to ask herself  whether in fact she was a spy, as she had to recognise that because the 
Securitate ‘make close examinations of  everyday behaviour’ and ‘employed a specific interpretative 
lens for what they gathered does not distinguish them from most other practitioners of  the 
ethnographic method’ (2014: 7).  
While these aspects of  the State Security’s strategies mirror the ethnographic project, 
Robert, in his question about my supervisors, was less interested in the practice of  gathering data 
but more concerned with how private data would become accessible to a third party that had the 
potential to harm someone. The difference between me and an unofficial Stasi member was that I 
did not divulge information to a third party, such as the state, in the knowledge that this information 
could potentially be used against them. Instead, for a great part of  my fieldwork, I had already 
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sabotaged this possibility by not asking further questions, so that I could not gain certain 
information, and by not writing conversations down, I also limited the potential for that 
information to become available to others. These strategies, which meant that I preferred feeling 
inadequate as an ethnographer to feeling the sensation of  reproducing the Stasi legacy, were 
counterproductive to my research project but were crucial to my own socialist past. Robert 
understood my concerns after I had explained about ethnographic research to him because both 
the practices and the terms attached to them resonated with an uneasy aspect of  the socialist past. 
Our mutual understanding was not simply based on our friendship but on our belonging to the 
same GDR generation. As such, we had an understanding of  a shared morality about historically 
constituted relations of  trust and complicity, to which I now turn in a discussion of  the public and 
private boundary during the socialist period. 
 
Late State-Socialism Revisited 
The utopian goal of  communism was the eradication of  all social hierarchies, which was to be 
achieved through the creation of  the ‘new socialist man’ and a socialist family model (Gal and 
Kligman 2000; Verdery 1996). The new socialist subject was not perceived as an autonomous 
individual but was to be, among other characteristics, ‘thoroughly imbued with collective thoughts 
and deeds’ (Fulbrook 2005: 115). Similarly, the family was not viewed as a private matter, but as 
‘basic collective’ that would together with society develop progressively (Borneman 1992: 80-90; 
Gal 2002: 86). In East Germany, the Jugendweihe ritual was re-introduced in 1954 (ZAJ 1986: 11). 
Its extra-curricular preparation classes  aimed to educate teenagers in their role as ‘socialist 
personalities’ (ZAJ 1986: 177; Gallinat 2005: 295).  The public ceremony but also the private family 
function connected individuals, families, and the state, through which the latter hoped to win the 
‘hearts and minds’ of  the population for its ideological venture (Wesser 2016). As such, the socialist 
state’s aim was to do away with the public/private dichotomy because what happened within the 
family was crucial for succeeding in its ideological project for a new and better future. While this 
endeavour had positive aspects, such as social policies that attempted to erase gender inequality, its 
main objective meant that the aspired-for ‘socialist family’ would eventually dissolve into a greater 
collective – the communist society. In other words, this process required what is deemed private 
and intimate to be rendered public, emphasizing the greater good of  an equal collective over that 
of  individuals and families. This aim was nicely condensed in the slogan ‘Vom Ich zum Wir’ (From 
I to We) that the GDR state promoted in the 1950s to encourage the rural population to join the 
agricultural collectives (LPGs). This utopian project towards an equal but also homogenised 
collective was recognised by most East Germans, however many simultaneously questioned its 
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viability, not least because intimate relations are generally considered to be of  a private nature. For 
example, the popular East German rock band Renft raised doubts about such processes of  
collectivisation in its ironic – but poignant – song ‘Gänselieschen’ (goose maiden), released in 1972:  
 
Our agriculture collective has one hundred geese 
And one goose maiden – she is mine. 
Every morning they march up on the meadow, 
One hundred geese and the one hundred and one. 
[…] 
 
 
The farmers appear to like it, 
But many of  them question themselves: 
The one hundred geese belong to all of  us,  
Why everything but the one hundred and one?  
[…] 
Yet behind them on my tractor, 
Drive I, the tractor driver, and keep watch 
So that nobody turns 
My dear maiden into public property. 9 
 
As such, ordinary East Germans – like people in other socialist countries – did think in 
terms of  public and private as oppositional categories. But the fact that the socialist state held a 
monopoly over public space made its purview inescapable. This omnipresence meant that ordinary 
people were in many ways always also part of  the state because almost all work, political, and leisure 
activities were part of  state ventures. Susan Gal (2002) has convincingly illustrated that we can 
understand the persistence of  the public/private dichotomy in both scholarly and lay thought 
through a semiotic approach, which can help us analyse what has been for many scholars of  state-
socialism a challenge: ‘How is it that public and private are so different in state-socialist societies 
and in capitalist parliamentary democracies, yet also eerily familiar?’ (2002: 80). She suggests 
viewing the public/private binary as discursive and fractal in the sense that the distinction can be 
reproduced by projecting it onto a narrower or broader context. As a result, any private ‘domain’ 
can also include a public and vice versa, through a recalibration that make such nested dichotomies 
possible. For example, the privacy of  the family home is contrasted with the public nature of  the 
street outside it. Yet when our focus shifts to the inside of  the home, the living room becomes ‘the 
public part of  a domestic private space’ (2002: 82) because our change in perspective leads to a 
reapplication of  the public/private dichotomy that again separates what was formerly entirely 
private into public and private (see also Gal and Kligman 2000). 
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 None of  the socialist states were successful in eradicating the public/private dichotomy, 
but this distinction under socialism diverged from that in capitalist democracies because it ‘was 
aligned with a discursive opposition between the victimized “us” and a newly powerful “them” 
who ruled the state’ (Gal 2002: 87). Indeed, what Robert and I had in common was our 
understanding of  how this intertwined dichotomy linked to everyday ethics. We had been brought 
up in a society where everyone knew that colloquial terms such as ‘VEB Horch und Guck’ (the 
People’s Enterprise Eavesdrop and Peek), die Firma (the firm) or sometimes indeed just die (they), 
meant the State Security. These terms were used by way of  making distinctions between ‘us’ (uns) 
and ‘them’ (die).  The clear ‘us’ versus ‘them’ simplified social reality and allowed people to 
distinguish between a trustworthy, private, familial and an untrustworthy, public ‘they’ who run the 
state, which involved – often unconscious – processes of  interweaving and constant embedding 
of  these categories of  public/private and them/us (Gal and Kligman 2000: 51). Put differently, 
what was referred to as public and private differed from that of  capitalist democracies in its 
referential content.    But the reference to the Stasi as the ‘People’s Enterprise Eavesdrop and Peek’ 
appears to have simultaneously recognised and mocked what Gal and Kligman have pointed out 
as an irony, in that ‘everyone implicitly knew, the “we” of  the private and the “they” of  the public 
were often the very same individuals’ (2000: 51). This duplicity was recognised as is reflected in 
such jocular references to the Stasi but also in political jokes. For example: 
At the Berlin Wall one border guard asks another: ‘What do you think about the GDR?’  
‘The same as you…’ 
‘Well, then I have to arrest you.’  
 
 
Such jokes make clear that the observable practice might be in opposition to the 
unobservable thought processes of  individuals. Alexei Yurchak (1997) argues that during late Soviet 
socialism such political jokes (anekdoty) were not told by way of  resisting the official state ideology, 
but that they served as a momentary release ‘in which one admitted not only one’s inability to 
struggle against the official ideology, but also one’s inability to struggle against one’s own simulated 
support of  this ideology’ (1997: 178). The reason for this, Yurchak holds, was that late socialist 
subjects were aware that official ideological representations did not tally with social reality but 
simultaneously experienced them as an immutable and omnipresent symbolic order, a ‘hegemony 
of  representation’ (1997: 166). Thus a political joke was funny because ‘it exposed the coexistence 
of  two incongruous spheres, official and parallel, and the subject’s simultaneous participation in 
both’ (1997: 180). The majority, that is, ‘normal Soviet subjects’ – unlike dissidents or activists – 
participated in official practices as they appeared inevitable, but whether or not they believed in the 
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official ideological aims was less important to them. Therefore, Yurchak calls these strategies 
‘pretence misrecognition’ (1997: 171) because ‘normal people’ pretended to misrecognise the falsity 
of  the official stance, mainly in order not to make their lives unnecessarily difficult and to continue 
with parallel unofficial practices. The majority of  ‘normal Soviet subjects’ therefore created an 
unofficial parallel culture that existed alongside the official state ideology. He defines the unofficial 
or parallel practices by type, such as the reading of  a novel during an official party meeting – both 
in public space. These political jokes vanished during and after glasnost – like most of  these types 
of  jokes in eastern Germany – because they no longer needed to sustain pretence misrecognition 
and expose the socially incongruous, which was now substituted by a public and more explicit 
discourse.  
My participation in Jugendweihe, as described in the introductory vignette, could be 
categorised as such a case of  ‘pretence misrecognition’, and indeed most East Germans had 
adapted to social life in the 1980s in this way. Yet Yurchak’s unofficial or parallel practices seem to 
be what Gal’s semiotic approach defines as nested subdivisions. The previously entire public space 
is reframed into the (private) reading of  a novel and the (public) proceedings of  the party meeting. 
The public and private are referred to by their same oppositional labels, however, they are 
‘dependent for part of  their referential meaning on the interactional context in which they are used’ 
(Gal 2002: 80). What first drew me to study Jugendweihe was not simply its association with the 
GDR but that it served as a locus for connecting individual, family, and state. The ritual’s adaption 
and continuation in post-Wende Germany simulated an unchanging continuity within the family 
not least because of  the fractal nature of  the public/private dichotomy which, as Gal explains, 
‘allows people to sense the family as stable in the midst of  frightening political-economic change’ 
(2002: 91). On close examination, however, it renders visible how social relations between 
individuals, families, and the new state have changed.  
 
The recursive nature of  the public/private dichotomy that enables us to conflate numerous 
nested public/private distinctions into a single one can be so narrowed down that we are left with 
the self, as in the case of  the border guard. That the GDR state encouraged and promulgated 
identification with it – not only but also through Jugendweihe – led to a highly internalised personal 
identification with this state. I do not suggest that all East Germans were loyal citizens during the 
socialist period. Rather, it was with the disappearance of  the country – not unlike with non-socialist 
states under threat or in crisis – that such identification became particularly amplified. As a 
teenager, I believed that everyone must have struggled to pledge allegiance to something they did 
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not truly believe in, partly because what we really thought was rarely – and certainly not openly – 
discussed. Even within my family, this issue of  the pledge never came up in discussion with my 
parents, and I instead sought advice from my Lutheran pastor. At the time, I doubted my parents 
would have taken my concerns seriously because there seemed to be an unspoken rule: participation 
in certain state activities as part and parcel of  not attracting unnecessary attention from state 
authorities, which in turn, could make life more difficult. However, to become a member of  the 
state-ruling SED party or to even just consider such a move, that is, for personal benefit, was 
frowned upon in my family. Membership of  a political party under state socialism was where my 
family’s moral boundaries were drawn. Moral boundaries are always embedded in political and 
religious convictions and are not necessarily in line with the state project. The oxymoron ‘voluntary 
coercion’ (freiwilliger Zwang) that was frequently used in relation to participating in Jugendweihe is 
perhaps the best example of  people’s awareness that their participation was their own decision but 
was not an affirmation of  state ideology. Some might have participated because they believed in 
the communist project. Others, though very few, openly refused participation due to their – usually 
religious – beliefs. Robert and I had participated in Jugendweihe – not out of  conviction nor fear 
of  repercussions – but because, like most children, we desperately wanted to become adults. We 
looked forward to being the centre of  attention for a day, to receiving presents, to celebrating with 
our classmates, and to having a large family celebration. As a fourteen-year-old, I certainly felt 
uneasy about the pledge, but I never pondered over the symbolic significance of  this public act 
either. For most, however, it was perfectly acceptable and not perceived as being dishonest to 
publicly pledge allegiance to the state. Rather it was indifference to state ideology – an ideology 
that ‘was so at the forefront of  everything that it seemed to have rendered itself  meaningless’ 
(Gallinat 2005: 299).  
Yet, what was not acceptable was to pretend to be ‘us’ while being ‘them’ in situations that 
were regarded as safe: among friends or family. And because unofficial Stasi members occupied a 
double-position – being private and public at once – and invested more loyalty in the state project 
than the social relations with friends and family, they acted unethically in the eyes of  ordinary East 
Germans. Such a betrayal is often just one side of  the coin which reads loyalty to a (different) cause 
on the other. It is through this ethical ambiguity in which competing moral values might make 
conflicting demands on a person – whether loyalty to one’s friends or family or to an ideological 
cause – that ‘accusations of  treachery often attract the most vehement, sometimes violent, 
condemnation’ (Kelly and Thiranagama 2010: 1-2). Robert and I shared an understanding of  this 
moral code because we belonged to the same late state-socialist generation. It is this insider 
knowledge that Michael Herzfeld (1997) describes as ‘cultural intimacy’ –  
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the recognition of  those aspects of  a cultural identity that are considered a source 
of  external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their 
assurance of  common sociality, the familiarity with the bases of  power that may at 
one moment assure the disenfranchised a degree of  creative irreverence and at the 
next moment reinforce the effectiveness of  intimidation (Herzfeld 1997: 3) 
 
As such, cultural intimacy is not tantamount to being acquainted with a culture but refers 
to the rather unpleasant parts of  one’s cultural identity (see also Herzfeld 2013). It is perhaps at 
this juncture that it becomes evident why Verdery – despite her in-depth knowledge of  Romania 
where she has conducted research since 1973 – did not experience the same sort of  gnawing on 
her conscience as I did during my fieldwork. Robert, on the other hand, grasped my concerns as a 
generational peer but our conversation also revealed how our familial ‘biographies shoved up 
against each other’, as Kath Weston puts it (in this collection). I never had any reason to doubt my 
trust in my parents. Yet the loyalty of  Robert’s mother to the former GDR’s project allowed him 
to entertain this kind of  mistrust of  her when he found the date that coincided with his parents’ 
divorce in his Stasi file. It was exactly because the Stasi not only observed self-confessed dissidents 
or regime critics – the enemy within society – but because it saw every citizen as a potential enemy 
of  its cause. As ‘Shield and Sword of  the Party’, it thus also observed those closest to the cause, its 
loyal SED members, whose families had perhaps the greatest potential to derail the progress 
towards communism because they were supposed to be role models for society at large. Families 
under state socialism were hence not homogenous partly because their members may have 
supported working toward the communist goal, opposed it, or have been somewhere in between. 
This stance toward the political elite not only determined how family life should be lived, it led also 
to tensions among kin, some of  which reverberate in the present.  
 
Conclusion 
The ethical issues related to trust and intimacy, values we hold dear, are dealt with by all 
anthropologists because we not only study social relations but we depend on them – they are our 
research tools – as is clear in other contributions to this volume (see Introduction and articles by 
Stafford and Weston). Every one of  us has felt pangs of  conscience, hints of  betrayal, or 
uncomfortable sensations at some point during fieldwork or in the process of  writing up. And of  
course, many of  these sensations are there because we are aware that we also occupy a double-
position: more often than not, we are both researchers and friends with the people who have shared 
parts of  their lives with us. Yet, as I hope I have illustrated, there is a subtle but important difference 
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as to why fieldwork posed an ethical dilemma for me with such a vengeance. Like our interlocutors, 
we as anthropologists are historical subjects and hence our own experiences have shaped our 
understanding of  the past as much as that of  the present. Recognising the parallels in practice 
between that of  an unofficial Stasi informant and that of  an ethnographer made me mistrust 
myself  and question whether what I was doing was ethical. It led me to repeatedly question whether 
I was really a good friend or whether my motivations were for some sort of  personal gain, that is, 
for the sole benefit of  my research project – betraying rather than protecting the intimacy of  such 
social relations. Nonetheless, there was more to it. For instance, my hesitations – albeit infrequent 
– to ask more difficult questions about the past were not only due to concerns about not intruding 
too far into my interlocutors’ privacy. I have come to believe that perhaps they were, at times, as 
much about protecting myself  from being disappointed in people I felt close to – not unlike Robert, 
who was unsure about how much he really wanted to know about his own familial past. He 
attempted to understand it – unsuccessfully – through his very thin Stasi file, because conversations 
with his mother on this topic, of  what he perceived as her greater loyalty to the communist cause 
than to her own son, remain still too hard to stomach for him – and perhaps for her too.  
To be clear, neither I nor Robert – like the great majority of  East Germans – have ever 
directly suffered at the hands of  the Stasi. Similarly, Verdery explains that she had ‘suffered less 
than many others’ from the Securitate, yet she had dedicated not only her professional career but 
also ‘much of  [her] emotional life for forty years […] to Romania’ (Verdery 2014: 5; my emphasis). 
Her ‘collegial relations and friendships deepened, and like many anthropologists, [she] was 
“adopted” into quasi-kinship roles’ (2014: 5). Her reasons for engaging with her ‘file as an 
ethnographic object’ were thus motivated by her difficulties in discovering ‘who among my 
associates reported on me’ (2014: 5). Indeed, this emotional investment in social relations is what 
unites all three of  us – and, I suggest, all human beings. But by exploring these socialist pasts it is 
also rendered so much more tangible and painful to us that the ‘possibility of  betrayal is the ever-
present dark side of  intimacy, taking on new and ever more frightening forms in the context of  
state-building’ (Kelly and Thiranagama 2010: 3).  
 
Not unlike Verdery, I had chosen a research topic to understand the socialist past better, 
and with it my own positioning and that of  the people close to me. For me, the reason was partly 
my own feeling of  loss after the demise of  the GDR, and my hope to find a more objective view 
through academic study. In his novel 89/90 Peter Richter (2015) traces the events of  the Wende – 
the political change or turn – from the perspective of  a male teenager, his sixteen-year-old main 
protagonist, who, incidentally, was not only the same age as Richter but also the same age as me at 
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the time of  the fall of  the Wall. On 2nd October 1990, a day before German unification and thus 
the last day of  the existence of  the German Democratic Republic, he describes a scene starting 
with the sentence that ‘for the last time the sun set above the first workers-and-peasant-state on 
German soil, this little shit country that yet somehow was also ours…’ (Richter 2015: 404; my 
emphasis). It was this latter part that I had been interested in understanding – how one could feel 
intimately connected to an abstract polity once it was gone, although one had not particularly liked 
it during its existence. These sensations of  liberation and loss associated with the end of  a political 
regime reflect the end of  both citizens’ constraints to its authority and that of  an emotional bond 
between them (Borneman 2004). 
 
This emotional bond to an abstract entity, however, is made up of  those social relations 
that are always also created in relation to wider socio-historical processes. As such, the ‘our’ in 
Richter’s words on the disappearance of  a country is more than simply a symbolic emotional bond. 
States – and this holds particularly true for the GDR – do not only employ kin idioms or other 
symbolic forms to create such emotional bonds, as Herzfeld’s concept of  cultural intimacy seems 
to suggest. Rather, political elites create allegiances to a state project by using ‘what is immediately 
intimate, the local, the familial, the neighbourly, the friend […] that are projected and enlarged by 
analogy to country, state and people’ (Feuchtwang 2010: 227). Talking to Robert about his anxieties 
and about mine led me to see what was in front of  my eyes all along and had been the focus of  my 
research: the complex relations between kinship, politics, and the self  – and in which I was a 
participant myself. 
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Footnotes 
1 On the ritual’s contested nature in eastern Germany see Gallinat 2002: 36-67. 
2 Federal Commissioner for the Records of  the State Security Service of  the former German Democratic 
Republic; in short Behörde für Stasi Unterlagen (BStU) 
3 This figure includes also 1,550 Stasi collaborators active in West Germany (Müller-Enbergs 2008). After 
a BStU historian challenged the number of  189,000 IMs (Kowalczuk 2013) a debate ensued that led to a 
BStU report published in June 2014 explaining: ‘It needs to be emphasised that this is a statistic of  a 
bureaucratic apparatus, which ultimately counts statistical processes, which cannot always be equated with 
the role of  the people behind them. One of  the greatest deficit of  the IM statistics is due to the fact that 
it counted in the total – at all times – active IM registrations which were not actually active.’ (Engelmann 
2014: 5). The BStU continues to state on its website that “[b]y 1989 the State Security had about 189,000 
unofficial collaborators – one for about every 90 GDR citizens.” See  
http://www.bstu.bund.de/EN/MinistryOfStateSecurity/UnofficialCollaboratorsOfMfS/_node.html  
(accessed 07/01/2016) 
4 IM for Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborator); prior to 1968 they were called ‘secret informers’ 
(Geheimer Informator). 
5 She did not use beobachten as in ‘to observe’ but bespitzeln as in ‘to spy on someone’. 
6 http://www.zeit.de/2010/51/S-Hoyerswerda (accessed 07/01/16) 
7 Deckname – alias/code name/pseudonym 
8 Verdery might have been well aware of  these parallels before, and used this as a stylistic device to draw 
her readers into her intellectual journey through the Securitate archives. Yet the point I am trying to 
advance below holds, because Verdery apparently did not at the time experience the same sort of  ethical 
dilemma in doing fieldwork as I did. 
9 Renft were banned in 1975 because of  their critical song lyrics. 
                                                            
